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Other People's Money: How a Time-Gap in Credit Reporting May
Lead to Fraud

I. INTRODUCTION

While harp music played and leaves fell in the North
Carolina Blue Ridge Mountains, real-estate developer Tony
Porter promised investors big gains with no cash investment and
little risk.1 The scene was set: a small mountain art community
where baby boomers and retirees were "flocking . . . in droves"
causing land values to rise dramatically. 2 Investors' confidences
were bolstered by a $16 million loan from Sunset Financial
Resources, Inc. made to get the new residential home project
underway.3 So, investors like Henry Gerrits, an engineer, and
Sherron Shields, a loan officer, obtained mortgages totaling
$375,000 and $900,000, respectively, to invest in their future.4 In
total, Mr. Porter convinced nearly 200 investors, who borrowed
over $100 million, to invest in the Village of Penland! The dream
of a picturesque community, however, vanished quickly and left
raw an elaborate fraud.6 By early 2007, four major banks were
claiming losses in the millions and investors were left with their
credit in shambles and buried in debt with monthly payments in
the thousands of dollars on land worth only a fraction of what they
paid for it.7 The crux of the scheme, and what will be the major
focus of this Note, is how the fraudsters were able to defraud their

1. Ann Carrns, 'I Feel Like an Idiot', WALL ST. J., July 18, 2007, at B1.
2. Id.
3. Id. Sunset Financial Resources, Inc. is now part of Alesco Financial Inc.
Complaint 35, North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Peerless Real Estate Services, Inc.,
No. 3:07-cv-00032-HWM-HTS (N.C. Sup. Ct. filed June 25, 2007), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/128901/coopercomplaint [hereinafter Penland Real Estate
Complaint].
4. Carrns, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Penland Real Estate Complaint, supra note 3, 34, 37.
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"investors." 8

At its highest, the mortgage industry is a $2.37 trillion
industry,' constituting almost one-fifth of the United States gross
domestic product.'0 Mortgage fraud perpetrated in 2006 has been
estimated to cost anywhere between almost one billion dollars and
$4.2 billion, and the numbers are rising each year." Moreover,
mortgage fraud investigations conducted by the FBI have
increased over 420% since 2002.12 Victims include • federally
• 14
insured financial institutions,13 government entities,
and
5
investors.
Lenders rely heavily on the three national consumer
reporting agencies (CRAs) 16 for information about credit scores
and payment histories of prospective borrowers. 7 Under current
law, all entities who furnish credit and debt information to CRAs
have no obligation to submit information in a timely manner, in a
certain format, with consistency, in full, or even to report at all. 8
The only duty imposed on those who report information about
consumers is to not submit information known to be inaccurate or
8. Id. $ 19.
9. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, United States, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html#Econ (last visited
Jan. 26, 2008).
10. Id. The $2.37 trillion figure is based on a 2006 estimate of a US GDP of
$13.06 trillion. Id.
11. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mortgage Fraud: New Partnerships to
Combat Problem, Mar. 9, 2007, http://www.fbi.gov/page2/march07/mortgage030907
.htm. This number does not include an estimated $1.2 billion spent on fraud
prevention. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2006 Mortgage Fraud Report, May
2007, at 2, http://www.fbi.gov/publications/fraud/mortgagefraud06.htm [hereinafter
2006 Mortgage FraudReport].
12. Federal Bureau of Investigation, supra note 11. The FBI had 436 open files
in September of 2002 and 1,036 in March 2007. Id.
13. Id. Fifty-seven percent. Id.
14. Id. Eight percent. Id.
15. Id. Thirty-five percent. Id.
16. E.g., Robert B. Avery et al., Credit Report Accuracy and Access to Credit,90
FED. RES. BULL. 297, 298 (2004) [hereinafter Credit Report Accuracy]. The three
national CRAs are TransUnion, Equifax, and Exeperian. Id.
17. Id. at 297.
18. E.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: UNDER SECTIONS 318 AND
319 OF THE FAIR AND ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003. i (2004),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/facta/041209factarpt.pdf;
Credit Reports: Con-sumers'
Ability to Dispute and Change InaccurateInformation, HearingBefore the H. Comm.
on Fin. Serv., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Stuart K. Pratt, Consumer Data
Industry Association (CDIA)).
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for which there is "reasonable cause" to believe is inaccurate.' 9
Even when reported information is submitted in a timely,
complete, and accurate manner, it still typically takes a minimum
of thirty days to appear on a credit report.2 ° Perpetrators of
mortgage fraud are thus given the opportunity to "work"
undiscovered during the gap in time that occurs between when a
loan is made and when it appears on a credit report.2' In this class
of fraud, perpetrators take advantage of lenders, and borrowers,
who are unaware that credit has already been issued on a piece of
real property, or that numerous loans are simultaneously being
issued to a borrower. The purpose of this Note is to illuminate
loopholes in the mortgage lending system and current laws
regulating credit reporting, showing that a change in the system
itself is necessary to prevent mortgage fraud.
Part II of this Note will provide background information on
lending practices and how the credit reporting system has been
manipulated under three different mortgage fraud schemes.23 Part
III will describe and analyze the current laws and agencies that
govern credit reports and credit reporting, showing that a loophole
for fraud remains. 24 Finally, Part IV will consider whether more
regulation is needed to close the gap, specifically considering
recently proposed legislation and a change to the credit reporting
system. 25
II. BACKGROUND

A.

CreditReporting
Credit reporting plays a central role in the mortgage

19. FAIR CREDIT REPORTING AcT (FCRA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681s-2(A)(1)(a)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
20. Interview with Prof. Ed Van Wesep, Asst. Professor of Finance, UNC Sch.
Bus., in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Oct. 4, 2007); see also Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Report to Congress on Credit Scoring and Its Effects on the
Availability and Affordability of Credit Scoring and Its Effects on the Availability
and Affordability of Credit, Aug. 2007.
21. See infra Part II, Subheading C.
22. Id.
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part IV.
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industry.26 Credit reports contain a wide array of data concerning
the credit history of individuals, and are heavily relied on by
creditors in assessing the creditworthiness of potential borrowers.27
Credit reports are central to the decisions of creditors regarding
whether to extend credit, and if so, at what rate. 28 Good credit
scores essentially correlate to lower interest rates.29 Without credit
reporting agencies, consumers would have access to less credit,
while paying more for credit that is extended. 3° Furthermore,
credit reporting has benefited from the use of technology over the
past few decades to increase the accuracy and completeness of
files.31 However, the system still has flaws and various aspects of it
need improvement. 32
CRAs are only as effective as the information they
receive.33
CRAs receive data from creditors, governmental
entities, collection agencies, and third-party intermediaries, who
are not bound by federal or state law to report data on credit
users. 34 In fact, one study found that eight percent of consumers
surveyed reported that their credit file was "missing major credit,
loan, mortgage, or other accounts., 35 The only requirement is that
when information is furnished the creditor cannot know or have
"reasonable cause" to believe it is "inaccurate. 36 Otherwise, the

26. See, e.g., Credit Report Accuracy, supra note 16, at 297.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 298.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 320. Documented benefits of credit reporting include: greater access to
credit, especially for typically underserved populations; quicker reaction to market
changes; dramatic changes in time elapsed to approve a loan (from "close to three
weeks" prior to automated underwriting, to the majority only taking "two to three
minutes" in 2002); and decreased cost of closing a loan, making homeownership rates
rise. See MICHAEL TURNER, INFORMATION POLICY INSTITUTE, THE FAIR CREDIT
ACCESS, EFFICIENCY
&
OPPORTUNTIY:
REPORTING ACT:
IMPORTANCE OF FAIR CREDIT REAUTHORIZATION 37-39 (2003).

THE

ECONOMIC

31. Turner, supra note 30; see also Electronic Privacy Information Center, The
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the Privacy of Your Credit Report, Sept. 22,
2007, http://www.epic.org/privacy/fcra/.
32. Credit Report Accuracy, supra note 16, at 320.
33. See e.g., Interview with Prof. Ed Van Wesep, supra note 20.
34. Credit Report Accuracy, supra note 16, at 298.
35. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 18, at 24.
36. FCRA, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681s-2(A)(1)(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
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amount, the frequency,
unregulated 37
.
B.

and the method

of reporting

is

Mortgage Loans

A "mortgage" is "[a] conveyance of title to property that is
given as security for the payment of a debt or the performance of a
duty and that will become void upon payment or performance
according to the stipulated terms."3" In a home mortgage, real
property is used as collateral for the loan.3 9 Aside from some states
requiring the participation of attorneys,4 ° there are two essential
parties to a mortgage loan transaction: the creditor or lender, who
loans the money in return for a lien on the real property,• and
the
41
debtor, who is obligated to repay or be subject to forfeiture.
A recent development in the mortgage lending industry has
been the increased participation of mortgage brokers.42 Mortgage
brokers act as intermediaries, matching loan applications, which
are taken from banking and other mortgage lending institutions,
with mortgage products.43 In the past, applying for a loan and the
pricing of a loan were done primarily at a local bank, often selling
only its own products. 44 Mortgage brokers, on the other hand,
often represent a large and wide array of lenders.45 The growth of
mortgage brokers has been widespread: in 2001, around sixty-five
percent of all mortgages, a number that has surely risen, were
handled by a mortgage broker, each often dealing with five to ten

37. CreditReport Accuracy, supra note 16, at 298.
38. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1026-27 (8th ed. 2004).
39. Id.
40. Email from Daniel Garner, Executive Legal Counsel to the N.C. Office of the
Comm'r of Banks, and David Worth, Office of the N.C. Comm'r of Banks, to J. Alex
Heroy, (Oct. 15, 2007) (on file with N.C.B.I journal) (noting that in some states, the
presence or participation of an attorney is not required in real estate transactions);
see also Joyce Palomar, The War Between Attorneys and Lay Conveyancers-Empirical Evidence Says "Cease Fire!",31 CONN. L. REV. 423 (1999).
41. Mortgage Bankers Association, Buy a Home, http://www.homeloanlearning
center.com/Howdoyou/BuyaHome.htm, at Step 6 (last visited Dec. 21, 2007).
42. Robert B. Avery et al., The 2006 HMDA Data, 93 FED. RES. BULL.
(forthcoming 2007) (draft at 9).
43. Id. (draft at 9-10).
44. Id. (draft at 10).
45. Mortgage Bankers Association, supra note 41, at Step 1.
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lenders simultaneously. 6
Aside from some smaller local banks and credit unions,
most institutions or brokers who receive loan applications today
will "shop the loan around., 47 This means that the loan application
will be offered to numerous lenders to determine who will give the
borrower the best price.4 These potential lenders, as a normal
procedure, request the credit report of the borrower and decide
whether to extend a loan, and if so, at what rate.49 Credit report
inquiries, unlike actual loans themselves, appear immediately on
credit reports; therefore, it is typical for a lender to see numerous,
recent inquiries into a report. ° Following an inquiry, a lender will
decide, based partially on what is contained in the credit report,
whether or not to extend credit." It is then the decision of the
broker and the borrower whether to accept the loan. 2 If the loan
is accepted, the terms will be formalized and the loan will "close."5 3
The closing is the final step in the loan process "whereby the
conveyancing documents are concluded and the money and
property transferred," in a legal transaction between buyer and
seller. 4 It is common practice in the mortgage lending industry for
46. Turner, supra note 30, at 24. Cf Ending Mortgage Abuse: Safeguarding
Homebuyers: Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Subcomm. on Housing, Transportation, and Community Development 9 (2007)
(testimony of Michael D. Calhoun, Center for Responsible Lending) (stating that
mortgage brokers account for the origination of forty-five percent of all mortgages),
www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/senate-testimony-m-calhoun-june-26-2007.pdf.
It
should also be noted that while brokers are beneficial to consumers, there is ample
criticism of financial motivations and lack of regulation of broker-originated loans.
See, e.g., id. at 8-9 (noting the limited liability of financially motivated mortgage
brokers in the loans they broker).
47. Mortgage Bankers Association, supra note 41, at Step 5.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Robert B. Avery, et al., An Overview of Consumer Data and Credit
Reporting, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 70 (2003) [hereinafter An Overview of Consumer Data
and Credit Reporting]. This is especially so in the case of mortgages and auto loans.
Interview with Prof. Ed Van Wesep, supra note 20. Inquiries appear immediately
because CRAs have all the requisite information; when Lender X inquires into
Borrower Y's credit report, the CRA has the information from the point of inception,
they must be asked for the report, and therefore the inquiry can be added
immediately or almost immediately.
Telephone Interview with Equifax
representative, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Sept. 20, 2007).
51. See Turner, supra note 30, at 24.
52. Id.
53. Mortgage Bankers Association, supra note 41, at Step 5.
54. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 248 (8th ed. 2004).
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the lender to report the issuance of the loan sometime during the
month, or two, following the closing.5
Entities that regularly furnish information to CRAs,
including mortgage lenders, typically report all recent data once a
month to CRAs, at which point it is processed and incorporated
into the credit report within one to seven days.56 The effect of this
is that the time period from the extension of credit to the
appearance of the loan on a borrower's credit report ranges from
just over a month to as long as ninety days. During this time-gap
lenders are unaware of credit actions of consumers, and are
vulnerable to fraud.
C.

Mortgage Fraud

The time-gap between when a borrower is issued a loan
and when the loan appears on their credit report is a dangerous
time because lenders and borrowers cannot accurately track loan
transactions that may have transpired. Fraudsters can take
advantage of this information gap, because lenders and other
institutions do not have full access to information. 9 Three
examples of how the delay in reporting credit transactions to the
credit reporting agencies may have facilitated mortgage fraud are
discussed below.
The result of time-gap fraud is that banks and lenders
suffer as they are left "hold[ing] a third, fourth, or fifth lien on a
property." 6 Each time, the properties are foreclosed and banks
and lenders must write the loans off as a loss. 61 The neighborhoods
themselves are also victims of these schemes because overblown
55. Interview with Ed Van Wesep, supra note 20.
56. Credit Report Accuracy, supra note 16, at 298. Each agency may receive
"more than 2 billion items of information each month." An Overview of Consumer
Data and Credit Reporting, supra note 50, at 49. Another study found that CRAs
may receive more than 4.5 billion items each month. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra
note 18, at 16.
57. Telephone Interview with Equifax representative, supra note 50; see
Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra note 31.
58. See infra Part II.C.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Nguyen, 493 F.3d 613, 617-18, 621 n.3 (5th Cir.
2007).
60. 2006 Mortgage FraudReport, supra note 11.
61. Id.
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appraisals push property taxes up, and foreclosures drive the
property values down.62
1. State of North Carolina v. Peerless Real Estate Services, Inc.,
Village of Penland, LLC, et al.
On June 6, 2007, North Carolina Attorney General Roy
Cooper filed a civil complaint on behalf of the State of North
Carolina against a group of developers who allegedly defrauded
around 200 investors and consumers out of hundreds of millions of
dollars.63 Cooper alleged that one common scheme involved
defendant developers selling ten, fifteen, or twenty lots of land to
investors in exchange for various promises6" To lure in investors,
the defendants allegedly promised investors the receipt of eight
percent of the loan proceeds at closing, 65 no down payment,66 a free
house in the community, and/or $100,000 for each house sold on an
investor-owned lot.67 Defendants further agreed to make the loan

payments for at least a year, and promised to buy back the lots
within three years. 68 The appraisal of each lot was "grossly
inflated" at $125,000, when often the lots had tax values of lower
than $20,000, could not support septic systems, did not have access
to roads or utilities, or were as small as one-twelfth of an acre. 69 In
62. Gerri Willis, CNN Heroes: Homeowner Uncovers Mortgage Fraud, CNN,
Sept. 22, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/18/mortgage.fraud.heroes/index.html
?iref=mpstoryview.
Ultimately, if values go down, the properties would be
reappraised at lower values, which would reduce property taxes. Id.
63. See Penland Real Estate Complaint, supra note 3, 17-38; see, e.g., Carrns,
supra note 1. Criminal prosecutions may be forthcoming, as FBI agents have raided
Tony Porter's office; however the FBI has declined to comment on an investigation.
Id.
64. Penland Real Estate Complaint, supranote 3, 1 18-23.
65. Tim Simmons, Banks aided fraud, investors say: A lawsuit accuses BB&T,
First Charter of Charlotte and two other banks in a mountain-retreatfiasco that left
investors owing at least $80 million, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Nov. 21, 2007, at
D1.
66. Carrns, supra note 1.
67. Penland Real Estate Complaint, supra note 3, T 20.
68. Id. The defendants agreed to set up an escrow account sufficient to fund the
primary bank loan payments for the first year. Id. Defendant Porter offered to back
the loan repayments from his personal account if defendant Communities of Penland,
L.L.C. did not pay off the second loan within the first year. Id. At the end of three
years, defendants agreed to repurchase the property at the initial sales price. Id.
69. Id. 9127.
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329

a ten-plot scheme, for instance, consumers were asked to apply
"for credit to purchase ten lots at the Village of Penland for a total
of $1,250,000."' 0 The defendants then arranged for each consumer
a primary bank loan of $1,000,000 and a second loan for the
balance of $250,000.71
Once a consumer agreed to partake in the "investment
opportunity," an employee of one of the defendant companies, or
a subsidiary thereof, "sent each consumer four or five loan
applications for different lenders and told them to complete each
loan application. 7 2 The defrauded consumers rarely dealt directly
with the lenders because employees of the defendants handled all
aspects of the transactions.73 Defendants then sent out "all of the
loan applications to all of the lenders. 7 4 In this way, the
defendants were able to take out multiple loans in the name of
each borrower because the lenders were unaware of the
contemporaneous or very recent credit extensions by other
lenders. It is alleged that the defendants then mailed the closing
documents to the borrowers with no explanation or direction
except "where to sign., 7 6 As a result, the "investors" qualified for
and received loans from multiple lenders simultaneously.7 7
However, had the lenders, or even possibly the investors, known
that contemporaneous loans were being issued, it is unlikely that
the lenders would have extended additional credit without, at

70. Id. 20. Interestingly, investors were not allowed to pay cash for lots, but
could only do so through credit transactions. Id. 19.
71. Penland Real Estate Complaint, supra note 3, 20. There are also a host of
other alleged violations in connection with this litigation, including fraudulent
appraisals, violations of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §
1701, et seq. and a litany of unfair and deceptive trade practices. Id. 39-46.
72. Penland Real Estate Complaint, supra note 3, 24.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. However, recent allegations suggest that the banks might have been
involved in the scheme, and were covering up obvious signs of fraud such as identical
loan packages, the same picture being used for multiple loans, and the same appraiser
and attorney used in all the loans. Tim Simmons, Suit Claims BB&T hid real estate
scheme, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Dec. 7, 2007, at Dl; Tim Simmons, 2 N.C.
Banks Accussed in Fraud Suit, THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Nov. 21, 2007, at 1D.
The banks have denied the allegations. Tim Simmons, BB&T denies coverup
allegations,RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Dec. 8,2007, at D1.
76. Penland Real Estate Complaint, supra note 3, 25.
77. Id. [ 24.
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least, further investigation. 8 It is clear that the defendants,
lawyers and savvy businessmen, 79 knew that they could take
advantage of a system where lenders did not know if credit had
been extended within the last month, or even the last two or three
months.
The perfect scene began to fall apart in the spring of 2007
when investors received an email from Tony Porter apologizing
that the land values were not rising as quickly as predicted. ° Not
long after the first email, investors received a letter stating that the
defendants could no longer afford to make payments on their
mortgages, leaving investors to make the hefty monthly
payments. 81 Furthermore, not only were hopes of repurchase by
the defendants gone, but the defendants failed to get further than
the preliminary phase of constructing a development, as
promised.82 It is alleged that the defendants received "well over
$100,000,000 in proceeds from loans extended to consumers who
purchased lots at the Village of Penland." 83 The defendants spent
all or almost all of the proceeds,"4 leaving the borrowers and
lenders straddled with millions of dollars in debt and three North
Carolina banks and one South Carolina bank reeling from the
same. 85
2. "Mei Enterprises and the Straw Buyer Bank Fraud Scam"

6

In a similar scheme, which the United States "government
claims [was] the largest mortgage-loan-fraud operation ever
78.
79.
80.
37.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. 2-16.
Carrns, supra note 1; see also, Penland Real Estate Complaint, supra note 3.,

Carrns, supra note 1.
Penland Real Estate Complaint, supra note 3, J 31.
Id. 34.
84. Developer leaves failed projects in his wake, ASSOCIATED PRESS, WCNC,
Aug. 12, 2007, available at http://www.wcnc.com/news/southcarolina/stories/wcnc081307-jmn-developer.2eab7aa7.html. According to the court-appointed receiver,
one defendant corporation had $18,000 in a bank account, but the other defendants
have filed for bankruptcy. Id.
85. Carrns, supra note 1.
86. See United States v. Moncrief, 133 Fed. Appx. 924, 926 (5th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (unpublished).
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prosecuted," at least twenty-three individuals were involved in a
conspiracy that took advantage of the gap in time between when a
loan is made and when it appears on a credit report.87 Under this
scheme, defendants "would apply for a loan on [a] straw
borrower's behalf to ostensibly finance the sham purchase of a
home the [defendants] 'owned' according to their doctored title
documents., 88 The straw borrower could be an innocent or
fictional person. Then, providing the lender "false inflated house
appraisals, false title commitments, and false information on the
straw borrower's loan application to boost the borrower's
creditworthiness," the defendants obtained an artificially inflated
loan amount; this part of the scheme was referred to as the "loan
transaction." 90 The defendants then used the loan proceeds to buy
the house at its true value, and kept the difference between the
mortgage loan amount and the lower purchase price, in what was
deemed the "cash transaction."' 91 The defendants repeated this
scheme no less than one hundred times, using numerous straw
borrowers." As the transactions started to appear on credit
reports the defendants switched straw borrowers. 93 What made the
scheme possible, testified one co-conspirator, was that the
fraudsters could quickly complete up to five transactions per straw
borrower before they began to appear on the straw borrower's
credit report.94

87. Id. at 926-35; see also, United States v. Nguyen, 493 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2007).
88. Nguyen, 493 F.3d at 617.
89. Id. See also Gerri Willis, CNN Heroes: Homeowner Uncovers Mortgage
Fraud, CNN, Sept. 22, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/18/mortgage.fraud.her
oes/index.html?iref=mpstoryview. Illegally buying and then immediately selling real
estate in order to make a profit, or illegal property flipping, is the most common form
of mortgage fraud. 2006 Mortgage FraudReport, supra note 11.
90. CNN Heroes: Homeowner Uncovers Mortgage Fraud (CNN broadcast Sept.
14, 2007) (video available at http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/18/mortgage.fraud.her
oes/index.html?iref=mpstoryview#cnnSTCVideo).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Nguyen, 493 F.3d at 617-18, 621 n.3; see also Willis, supra note 89 (noting that
fraudsters simply switch straw borrowers when loans begin to appear on credit
reports, allowing them to disappear before the fraud is discovered).

332
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3. HELOC fraud scheme
According to the FBI, there is another emerging scheme
that takes advantage of the gap in time between when a loan is
issued and when it appears on a credit report. 95 This newest
exploitation uses the "home equity line of credit (HELOC)
application process to conduct multiple-funding mortgage fraud
schemes, check fraud schemes, and potentially money launderingrelated activity., 96 A HELOC borrower typically borrows for
home repairs or bills by using a checkbook or credit card to
borrow against the equity of the home over a period of time,
usually on an as-needed basis. 97 Full title searches and property
appraisals are not often demanded on these types of loans, making
the perpetration of fraud that much easier. 98 In this scheme,
criminal groups apply for multiple HELOCs from different lenders
simultaneously to maximize credit extension on a property to
obtain credit well over the limit that could normally be acquired. 99
Again, when lenders receive a borrower's credit report, they find
nothing unusual and grant the loan. 00 The problem is that four or
five other lenders, all unknown to one another, have also granted
loans.1
Specifically in light of the N.C. v. Peerless Real Estate
Services, Inc., Penland Real Estate, et al. case, affected banks have
begun to implement their own internal safeguards to prevent
mortgage fraud in lot-development schemes that cost the banks
millions. 102 Among the internal checks being implemented are
"assigning fewer underwriters to handle consumer lot loans in one
state or region, upgrading software to detect unusual spikes in

95. 2006 Mortgage FraudReport, supra note 11, at 6.
96. Id.
97. Id. A HELOC is subordinated to any existing mortgage on the property,
such as the mortgage used to finance the purchase of the home, making it riskier for
lenders. E.g., Scott W. Carnahan, Home Equity Line of Credit Securitization: Issuer
Issues, 11.3 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 30 (2005).
98. 2006 Mortgage FraudReport, supra note 11, at 6.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. David Breitkopf, Out $100M, Lenders Look for Lessons, AMERICAN
BANKER, Jan. 7, 2008.

20081

CONSUMER FRAUD

loans in a branch or region, and requiring top executives to sign off
on predevelopment lot loans. 10 3 Although it is too early to know
if the checks are working, bank analysts have stated that it should
help to curb a "'weakness' in the banks' credit procedures, which
let many people borrow through the retail system but 'escape the
eyes of loan review because loan review is typically more focused
on commercial real estate exposure. ' ' 04
III. LEGISLATION AFFECTING LOANS AND CREDIT REPORTING

Credit reporting has been described by some as a "classic
public good."10 5 This means that those parties that bear the costs
of reporting in a timely and complete manner may benefit little
° That being the case, not all
from advancements in the system.'O
entities that benefit from the system contribute in turn.0 7 The end
result is that consumers and lenders are hurt because access to a
complete file is limited.19
Moreover, increased legislation and
regulation may have a backlash effect as greater complexity and
more demands may tempt furnishers of information to back out of
the system altogether rather than meet increased demands. °9
There is a federal statute, the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA)," ° amended by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions
Act (FACTA),"' which addresses credit reporting, but which does
not fix, nor directly address, the time-gap between when a loan is
made and when it appears on a borrower's credit report.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
CreditReport Accuracy, supra note 16, at 322.
Id.
Id.
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 18, at 13-14.
See CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE CREDIT, POLITICAL

& ECON. RESEARCH
COUNCIL, POLICY BRIEF: THE PROMISE OF NON-FINANCIAL DATA: How USING
ENERGY UTILITY AND TELECOMS PAYMENT DATA CAN HELP MILLIONS BUILD

ASSETS 8 (2007). Accuracy, consistency, completeness, timeliness and full reporting
may actually decrease as a result of increased liability and regulation. TURNER, supra
note 30.
110. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), Pub. L. No. 108-159, 84 Stat. 1127
(codified as amended 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-1 6 81(u)) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
111. The Fair and Accurate Transaction Act (FACTA), Pub. L. No. 108-159, 84
Stat. 1127 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-1681(u)) (2004).
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Additionally, some states have12 enacted laws specifically regarding
data breach and identity theft.
A.

FairCredit Reporting Act (FCRA)

Enacted in 1970,1" the FCRA intended "to promote
accuracy, fairness, and the privacy of personal information
assembled by Credit Reporting Agencies (CRAs). ' " 4 Congress
found that "fair and accurate credit reporting" is the foundation of
an efficient banking system, and that "[t]here is a need to insure
that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave
responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the
consumer's right to privacy.""' Enforcement of the FCRA was
granted to the Federal Trade Commission and other appropriate
116
federal financial agencies.
112. See, e.g., Bob Ryan & Eric Rosenberg, Legislative Update, TRANSUNION
(2007), available at http://www.transunion.com/corporate/business/clientSupport/reso
urces/legislativeUpdate.page (pdf files available for each update on website); see also
INFORMATION POLICY INSTITUTE, CREDIT FILE FREEZE: POSITION PAPER

3-6 (2005),

http://www.infopolicy.org/publications/freeze-final.pdf (noting specific states that
have enacted credit file freeze laws to guard against identity theft; and citing the
problem that although the Federal Trade Commission is given primary oversight, it
may not create binding regulations, and therefore, there is a need for a uniform
federal standard, at least in regards to credit file freeze laws); TURNER, supra note 30;
Kristan Cheng, Identity Theft and the Case for a National Credit Report Freeze Law,

12 N.C. BANKING

INST.

239 (forthcoming March 2008).

113. Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra note 31. The FCRA came into
effect on April 25, 1971. Id.
114. FCRA, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007). The Act was
engineered by Representative Leonor Sullivan and Senator William Proxmire amid
backlash against credit reporting agencies (CRAs) who were collecting "lifestyle"
data on consumers - from sexual orientation to drinking habits - and denying those
very consumers access to the files that were being used to deny them "services and
opportunities." Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra note 31.
115. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681.
116. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681s. Any violation of the FCRA is deemed to be an "unfair
and deceptive act or practice in violation of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act." Id. The Act also provides for enforcement by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Administrator of the National Credit
Union Administration, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Agriculture,
the States, and the FBI. Id. In addition, the US PATRIOT Act added that
"government agenc[ies] authorized to conduct investigations of, or intelligence or
counterintelligence activities or analysis related to ... terrorism" may obtain credit
reports for investigations, and such inquiries shall not appear on CRA reports. 15
U.S.C.A. § 1681v. Legislating enforcement of the Act to such a wide variety of
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The most important change brought about by the FCRA
was the requirement that credit files and credit scores be disclosed
to consumers." 7 Disclosure has helped prevent and discover fraud
and credit report errors."8 An equally important change was the
regulation of the type of data that could be collated in credit
files." 9 Gone were the days of collecting "lifestyle" data on credit
users; information now must be pertinent to a consumer's financial
history. ° Information that may be contained in consumer credit
reports includes the identification of "end-users" that obtained
reports for employment purposes over the past two years, or
inquiries "for any purpose" during the one year period preceding
the date on which the request is made.'' Other information was
limited in the length of time it may appear on credit reports. 2 The
FCRA also imposed a duty on CRAs to follow "reasonable
3
1 2
procedures" to provide "maximum possible accuracy.
Moreover, the Act imposes a duty that a furnisher of information
may not submit any information it "knows or consciously avoids
knowing" is inaccurate, and shall, "promptly," correct and update
any information on the credit report it determines is incorrect or
incomplete.'24 Consumers are given the right to dispute the

agencies makes it difficult for researchers to find any conclusive information as one is
constantly being directed to another agency. The effect this may have on the average
consumer or enforcement and fraud prevention of the Act is outside the scope of this
article.
117. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681g; see also Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra
note 31.
118. Mortgage Bankers Association, Your Finances, http://www.homeloanlearning
center.com/YourFinances.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2007); see also Electronic Privacy
Information Center, supra note 31.
119. Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra note 31.
120. Id.
121. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681g(3)(A)(i)-(ii).
122. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681c (stating that Bankruptcy actions may appear for ten
years, while "[c]ivil suits, civil judgments, paid tax liens, accounts placed for
collection, and records of arrest" may only appear for seven years). The Act also
provides that criminal convictions may appear indefinitely. Id.
123. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681e(b). During the 1970s, industry abuse was the norm,
including self-imposed industry "quotas of negative information on data subjects"
that forced investigators to fabricate information and leave files incomplete.
Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra note 31.
124. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681s-2(a).
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''accuracy or completeness" of any information contained in their
report. 25
Unfortunately, the Act only provides remedial measures
for victims 126 and does not, apart from listing permissible purposes
to solicit a credit report, 27 attempt to prevent fraud. The Act
contains no mention of the timeliness of items appearing
on a
18
credit report, or when they must be reported to CRAs.'
B.

Fairand Accurate Credit TransactionsAct of 2003

The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003
(FACTA) 129 amended the FCRA to "combat identity theft,
increase the accuracy of consumer reports, restrict the use of
medical information in credit eligibility determinations, and allow
consumers to exercise greater control regarding the type and
amount of solicitations they receive. 130 These goals primarily
manifested into remedies available to victims of fraud, including
extended fraud alert protections, provisions to opt-out of
prescreening and affiliate sharing,' and truncation of credit and
debit card numbers on electronically printed receipts. 32 FACTA
also allows for consumers to receive their credit report annually at

125. Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra note 31. Under the FCRA,
disputes must be made to CRAs rather than furnishers. Id. This was changed under
FACTA to allow consumers to make disputes directly against furnishers. 15
U.S.C.A. § 1681g.
126. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681c-1, 2. Remedies for those who have fallen victim to fraud
include placing fraud alerts in consumer files, access to free credit reports for victims,
and blocking information that is a result of fraud. Id.
127. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681b.
128. See generally FCRA, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-1681u (neglecting to discuss the
timeliness of when things must be reported to CRAs).
129. The Fair and Accurate Transaction Act (FACTA), Pub. L. No. 108-159, 84
Stat. 1127 (2004) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-1681(u)) (amending the
FCRA).
130. Interagency Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking:
Procedures to
Enhance the Accuracy and Integrity of Information Furnished to Consumer
Reporting Agencies Under Section 312 of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions
Act, 71 Fed. Reg. 14422, 14422 (Mar. 22, 2006) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 41,
222, 334, 571, 717, 660 and 661).
131. See TURNER, supra note 30, at 57-62. Used for third party credit offers. Id.
Controversy exists over how much this aids in fraud perpetration. Id.
132. Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra note 31.

CONSUMER FRAUD

2008]

no-charge from CRAs.'

Unfortunately, as important as these

amendments have proven, they fail to provide preventative
measures for combating fraud'- or close loopholes that allow for
fraud.135

In a key change, FACTA required those that furnish credit
information to CRAs to ensure the accuracy of files. 36 FACTA

amended § 1681s-2 of the FCRA to prohibit furnishers from
providing any information to CRAs that is "know[n]" to be
inaccurate or for which there is "reasonable cause to believe ... is

inaccurate."''
The credit reporting system is critically dependent
on the credit information that furnishers of such information
provide to CRAs. 36 Therefore, this FACTA amendment is an
important step in acknowledging that furnishers of credit
information must be held accountable. Furthermore, furnishers
have thirty days to investigate any claim by a consumer that
information in the consumer's file is inaccurate or incomplete. 9
Under a new section of FACTA, lenders who use consumer
credit scores in connection with closed- or open-ended loans that
are "secured by [one to four] units of residential real property...
shall provide [to the borrower] ...

a copy of the information...

that was obtained from a [CRA] or was developed and used by the
user of the information."' 4 Additionally, when a consumer
requests a credit score, a CRA shall supply:

133. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681j. The government has established/authorized a website
where consumers can request their credit reports at www.annualcreditreport.com.
Although, this provision aids in preventing fraud, it seems unlikely to make a
substantial impact on the niche of fraud loophole examined in this article.
134. See Cheng, supra note 112.
135. See Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra note 31.
136. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681s-2.
137. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681s-2. In its original form, the FCRA stated that a furnisher
of data shall not provide information that it "knows or consciously avoids knowing"
is inaccurate. Id.
138. See TURNER, supra note 30, at 5-6.
139. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681j. Upon receiving notice of dispute, furnishers typically
have thirty days to investigate, review all pertinent information, report to the CRA
and all others that received the information (if the dispute proves meritorious), and
correct the information. Id. The time period is forty-five days in the event that the
consumer provides new information during the original thirty-day period. Id.
140. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681g.

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 12

(A) the current credit score of the consumer or the
most recent credit score of the consumer that was
previously calculated by the credit reporting agency
for a purpose related to the extension of credit; (B)
the range of possible credit scores under the model
used; (C) all of the key factors that adversely
affected the credit score of the consumer in the
model used ...; (D) the date on which the credit
score was created; and (E) the name of the person or
entity that provided the credit score or credit file
upon which the credit score was created.4
This provision allows a conscientious borrower to monitor what
potential lenders see, 42 but does not solve the problem of the
integrity of the content and does little to prevent fraud that takes
advantage of the time-gap between making a loan and the loan's
appearance on a credit report. 143 A borrower is likely to see that
numerous lenders made inquiries into their credit, a product of
"shopping around" for lenders, but the report will not show for
some time if any of those inquiries resulted in the extension and
funding of credit.'" Of course, a borrower, or diligent lender,
could request his credit report two or three months after closing 45
and possibly discover if, in fact, fraud of this type had occurred,
but by this time the damage has been done.' 46
Section 312 of the FACT Act requires that "[t]he Federal
banking agencies, the National Credit Union Administration, and
the [FFC] shall ...(A) establish and maintain guidelines for use
by" furnishers of information to CRAs, "regarding the accuracy
and integrity of the information to consumers" that is furnished;
and (B) require furnishers to "establish reasonable policies and

141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. An Overview of Consumer Data and Credit Reporting, supra note 50, at 7273.
143. See supra Part II.C.
144. See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
145. Id.
146. See An Overview of Consumer Data and Credit Reporting, supra note 50, at
72-73 (detailing how lenders may also be victimized).
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procedures for implementing" the aforementioned guidelines.147 In
the first interim report presented to Congress on December 9,
2004, the FTC identified four areas to be studied: (1) "the effects
of requiring the CRAs to match more points of information (e.g.,
name, social security numbers, address) to ensure" proper
consumer identification; (2) the effect of requiring that consumers
receive copies of the same credit report used whenever an
"adverse action" is taken by creditors (based on the credit report);
(3) "the effects of requiring consumers to be notified whenever
negative information is added to their credit reports"; and (4) the
effects on determining creditworthiness of greater reporting in
areas typically not reported (e.g., utility payment history, rent
payment history). 148 Regrettably, it does not appear that further
study into preventative measures is undertaken by this study.
The FTC's Report does concern itself with the challenges
149
CRAs face in assuring accuracy and completeness of their files.
Indeed, the report has found that "a creditor or other furnisher of
data to the CRAs may provide information that is incorrect, may
provide incomplete information, or may not provide information
at all."15 The problem is compounded if incomplete consumer
identifying information is provided, resulting in mixed files,"'
fragmented files,"' and file segmentation. Lack of an obligation
to report to all three of the major CRAs, or even to report at all,
makes full accuracy and completeness all but impossible,154 and is
147. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681g (West 2000 & Supp. 2007). Section 319 states that the
study is to be completed over eleven years, with the final report due in 2014, and that
the Commission shall give interim reports every two years in the meantime. Id. §
319.
148. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 18, at ii. Each section of analysis begins
by discussing previous institutional studies, and then the report details a
comprehensive study of its own to be undertaken over the coming years. Id.
149. Id. at i.
150. Id. at ii.
151. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 18, at 13 (considering "mixed files" to be
"files that contain[] information pertaining to more than one consumer").
152. Id. File fragmentation exists where one consumer has more than one file,
resulting from instances when insufficient identifying information is provided to
match with an existing consumer file and CRAs are forced to open new files. Id. at
13-14.
153. Id. File segmentation results when a consumer, wary of the negative
implications of a poor credit report, seeks to manipulate the system by supplying
information that will not be matched to them. Id. at 51.
154. Id. at 12, 43. Note the dilemma: CRAs pushing for greater accuracy and
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further evidence that current legislation needs improvement.
One instance of incomplete and inaccurate information
exists when furnishers intentionally do not furnish or update
information for strategic reasons.'
Some creditors and lenders
intentionally fail to report so that the consumers who they charge
the highest rates will not receive competing credit offers at lower
rates. 56 Intentionally failing to submit data of responsible
borrowers likely had further affect on credit evaluations and credit
ratings of such consumers.'
Hopefully, since this tactic has been
exposed, Congress will be prompted to make new and more
assertive changes.
Additionally, the report made various findings directly
concerning mortgages.'59 The report found that "[g]iven the
importance of a mortgage transaction, both lenders (or brokers)
and their customers are likely to take care in checking that an
application is filled out properly and completely," and therefore,
information in credit reports on mortgages is more likely to be
reliable.' 6° This is inherent in a mortgage transaction,61 given that
each party is carefully looking out for its own interests because of
the significant amount of money involved. However, once a
lender approves and funds a loan, there is no incentive to
immediately report the loan to the CRAs; after all, the lender's
lien is already recorded and "in line."' 62 Secondly, the report
completeness may run contrary to ideas of capitalism. That is, full disclosure requires
that furnishers report to their competitors, and therefore the incentive to report
consumer credit information may be limited.
155. Id. at 12; CreditReport Accuracy, supra note 16, at 305, 310.
156. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 18, at 12. Subprime lenders may be the
largest culprit of this type of gaming. See id. Encouragingly, one study found that
instances of "missing credit limits on one or more ... revolving accounts" dropped
from seventy percent of files studied in 1999, to fourteen percent of files studied in
2003. Id. at 13 n.39 (citing Robert B. Avery et. al., An Overview of Consumer Data
and Credit Reporting, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 49 (2003)).
157. Credit Report Accuracy, supra note 16, at 305.
158. See Part III of this note for proposed changes in the Act. In addition,
changes proposed by this Note may also have a beneficial impact on further
proliferation of what has been deemed the "subprime mortgage crisis"; the extent to
which it may prevent further abuses, however, is outside the scope of this note. See
also Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra note 31.
159. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 18, at 43.
160. See id.
161. But see infra note 183 and accompanying text.
162. See Chapter 41: Recording of Instruments, PURCHASE AND SALE OF REAL
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found that when a borrower has consistently and timely made
mortgage payments "this typically will be reflected in his or her file
in nationwide CRA databases.' ' 163 The reason for this is that
mortgage brokers have substantial contacts with CRAs,
technology is used to facilitate data transfer to CRAs, and
mortgage lenders are extremely important to the business of
CRAs.' 64 It therefore seems irrational that given the prevalence of
fraud and the invaluable relationship between CRAs and
mortgage lenders that there are no systems, rules, or regulations in
place to enhance and precipitate the flow of data between these
two entities. It appears that the FTC and Congress, in less than
explicit terms, are hesitant to legislate and mandate, instead
preferring to advise in the area of fraud prevention '
This
reluctance is likely due to an aversion to overreach into a private
industry to change the voluntary nature of credit reporting.'66 The
prevalence of fraud and loopholes in the system, however, show
that legislation regulating the credit reporting industry is flawed
and needs improvement.
One more check on mortgage fraud involves examining the
identity of the perpetrators. Generally, attorneys are required to
perform title searches and issue "opinions" of title related to
mortgage trnscto.
il6eac7freodddouet
transacons.16 A title
search of recorded documents
researches the history of the property and the purchaser and
includes checking for liens and previous deed transfers.16s The
§ 41.02, MB (2007). In pure race jurisdictions, the first to record will
receive the first lien; in other jurisdictions the lien priority depends on whether the
purchaser has notice and buys in good faith. Id.
163. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 18, at 76.
164. The Accuracy of Credit Report Information and the FairCredit Reporting Act,
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong.
(July 10, 2003) (statement of Stuart K. Pratt, Consumer Data Industry Association
("CDIA").
165. See id. at 9; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681a-b (West 2000 & Supp. 2007)
(Congressional findings and purpose of the FCRA).
166. See Credit Reports: Consumers' Ability to Dispute and Change Inaccurate
Information, supra note 18; but see An Overview of Consumer Data and Credit
Reporting, supra note 50, at 73.
167. Email from Daniel Garner, Executive Legal Counsel to the N.C. Office of the
Comm'r of Banks, and David Worth, Office of the N.C. Comm'r of Banks, to J. Alex
Heroy (Oct. 15, 2007) (on file with N.C.B.I. journal); see also Joyce Palomar, The
War Between Attorneys and Lay Conveyancers--Empirical Evidence Says "Cease
Fire!",31 CONN. L. REV. 423 (1999).
168. Email from Daniel Garner, supra note 167.
PROPERTY,

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 12

closing attorney issues an "opinion" of title based on this search,
basically linking the attorney to the transaction; 169 a title opinion
"does not insure against undisclosed defects nor does it insure
marketable title,"'7 but may be necessary to obtain title
insurance." ' In at least two of the fraud schemes discussed, where
the time-gap has been exploited, there has been a flaw in the
attorney's, or equivalent closing agent's, assurance that the
transactions are legitimate.'
In PenlandReal Estate the attorneys
themselves were the fraud perpetrators or knowing participants in
the fraud scheme.'73 Theoretically, another type of potential flaw
in an attorney's title opinion could be that the attorney was
somehow defrauded along with lenders in the perpetuation of
fraud. 714 In states where attorneys are required to "participate" in
the mortgage loan closing, fraud, however, is generally, but not
' Not
always, averted because attorneys "value their law license." 75
all states believe that "preparing necessary documents and then
implementing them in a real estate title transfer transaction [i]s the
practice of law, which ha[s] to be done only by licensed
attorneys,' 76 and allow for others, such as escrow companies, to
finalize the transaction.'77 In either case, whether it is an attorney,
someone acting under the authority and guidance of an attorney,
or a layman, the closing entity must act as a "gatekeeper" in
keeping out this type of fraud,17 8which can only be perpetrated when
there is a failure at this level.

169. Id.
170. Sandy Gadow, What is an Attorney's Opinion of Title?, REALTY TIMES, Mar.
31, 2000, availableat http://realtytimes.com/rtcpages/20000331-optitle.htm.
171. Email from Daniel Garner, supra note 167 (noting the difference between a
title insurance and a closing defects policy).
172. Id.
173. See Complaint, supra note 3, 2-16.
174. Email from Daniel Garner, supra note 167.
175. Id.; see also Palomar, supra note 167.
But see Penland Real Estate
Complaint, supra note 3.
176. Email from Daniel Garner, supra note 167; see also United States v. Nguyen,
493 F.3d 613, 617 (5th Cir. 2007) (fraud perpetrators, employees of American Title
Company, acted as notary, escrow, and closing agents).
177. Id.
178. See generally id. (discussing how notary, escrow, and closing agents were
among the perpetrators of the fraud).
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IV. CLOSING THE LOOPHOLE AND FIXING THE PROBLEM"'
A.

STOP FRAUD Act

On April 25, 2007, Senator Barack Obama and Senator
Dick Durbin introduced a federal bill entitled "Stopping Mortgage
Transactions which Operate to Promote Fraud, Risk, Abuse, and
Underdevelopment Act" or the "STOP FRAUD Act."' 80 The Act
proposes changes to numerous existing laws, including the Truth in
181
Lending Act.
It would explicitly address mortgage fraud by
declaring it "unlawful for any mortgage professional to knowingly
execute, or attempt to execute a scheme or artifice - (1) to defraud
any natural person, financial institution,' ' 82 or other borrower in
connection with the extension of credit that is secured by either
real property or personal property that is to be used as a primary
dwelling, or "(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, any money or property,
including without limitation in the form of fees or charges, from a
natural person in connection with an extension of consumer credit
. . . secured by" either of the same listed in part "(i).' ' 3 The
proposed statute includes criminal penalties of up to 35 years in
prison and $5,000,000, and civil penalties measured by the sum of
"all finance charges and fees paid or payable by the" victim of the
fraud, and other damages, declaratory, injunctive and additional
relief (court costs, investigative costs and reasonable attorneys'

179. See Credit Reports: Consumers' Ability to Dispute and Change Inaccurate
Information, supra note 18. In the past, CRAs attempted to assert their power over
creditors by refusing to sell consumer reports to creditors who did not report. Id.
CRAs have also advocated the implementation of a standard electronic format,
called the "Metro" and "Metro 2" format, with success. Id. Their campaign was
successful with ninety-five percent of those reporting in 1996 implementing the Metro
format, and more than fifty percent using Metro 2, which was introduced in 1997, by
2003. Id. This shows that there was a correlation between the CRAs endorsement
and the high rate of implementation, but it does not tell us that one was a result of
the other - it could be just as likely that the new format was simply easier to use or
more efficient. It is difficult, therefore, to predict how influential CRAs are in
implementing policy changes.
180. S. 1222, 110th Cong. (2007).
181. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1602(e), (h), (v) (West 2000 & F. Supp. 2007).
182. S.1222, sec. 2, § 1351(a)(1).
183. Id. at sec 2, § 1351(a)(2).
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fees), for violators of the Act. 184 An aggrieved person may bring a
suit for recovery in any U.S. district court or state court having
jurisdiction without regard to the amount in controversy,
citizenship of the parties, or "exhaustion of any administrative

remedies."18'
Another proposed change expands the range of reports and
records that are required to be made available to the Secretary of
the Treasury and Federal law enforcement which have a "high
degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations
or proceedings, or in the conduct of intelligence or
counterintelligence

.

.

.

to

protect

against

international

terrorism."' 186

Under this proposal, enforcement agencies would
receive more reports involving "suspicious activity" in mortgage
transactions. 87 The desired effect would be twofold: first, more
institutions would be put in the "gatekeeper" function, hopefully
preventing more fraud; and, second, enforcement agencies would
uncover more schemes and instances of mortgage fraud.'8 As with
current legislation, fraud that passes through the "gatekeeper"
would only be stopped when it is eventually uncovered, meaning
still that consumers are already greatly harmed before the scheme
is discovered."
The legislation, although a step in the right
direction, does not strike at the heart of the fraud, the time-gap
loophole in the mortgage system.
The Act directs the Attorney General, in combination with

184. Id. at sec. 2, § 1351(b)(1)-(2). Under current law, 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000),
limitations on criminal convictions are limited at 30 years and $1,000,000. Under the
current version of § 1344, the government must prove that the accused: (1)
knowingly, (2) executed or attempted to execute, (3) a scheme or artifice to defraud
or to obtain, "by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or
promises", anything of value "owned by, or under the custody or control of ](4)] a
financial institution." United States v. Campbell, 64 F.3d 967, 975 (5th Cir. 1995).
Section § 1344 has been used to prosecute those who have defrauded banks,
including a case where a convicted person secured multiple loans on the same
collateral - automobiles. See United States v. Sheahan, 31 F.3d 595, 596-99 (8th Cir.
1994).
185. S. 1222, sec. 2, § 1351(c)(1)(A)-(C).
186. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5311 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
187. S.1222, § 3(b)(1).
188. See generally id. (stating that it is intended to stop fraud and abuse in

mortgage transactions).
189. See generally Carrns, supra note 1 (describing harm that has befallen victims
of the fraud perpetrators in Penland Real Estate).
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the Secretary of the Treasury, to "establish a system" whereby
interested parties "may register and receive updates from Federal
law enforcement agencies on-- (1) suspicious activity trends in the
mortgage industry; and (2) mortgage fraud-related convictions.
The Act also calls for a "Debarred or Censured Mortgage
Professional Database;"1' 9' "whistleblower protection" to protect
those in the industry providing "
more authority in
the Housing and Urban Development Act to allow the Secretary
to assist "tenants, homeowners, and other consumers with respect
- (A) to mortgage fraud . . . and (B) to any other activities or
practices . . . likely to increase the risk of foreclosure by such
individuals;"' 93 more reporting to the Secretary of Housing and
Development of uncovered fraud or deceptive practices by
mortgage professionals in an effort to create federal fraud watch
updates; 194 crackdowns "to improve the monitoring and
enforcement of housing appraisal regulation; ' 9' and more funding
to state and local law enforcement to combat fraud.' 9 In its
current form, the STOP FRAUD Act would devote a total of
$80,000,000 to affected entities to prevent and remedy fraud,
including the Department of Housing and Urban Development
and federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.' 97 More
than any piece of legislation thus far, the STOP FRAUD Act
makes proactive steps to combat mortgage fraud and gives specific
direction to Secretaries and law enforcement.
B.

North CarolinaLegislation

Recently enacted legislation in North Carolina avoids
making direct changes to the voluntary system of reporting credit
190. S. 1222, § 4(a).
191. Id. § 5(a).
192. Id. § 5(c).
193. Id. at sec. 6, § 106(g)(1).
194. See id. at sec. 6, § 106(g)(4)(A)-(B).
195.. Id. § 7(a).
196. See S. 1222, § 8. The Act also grants additional rights to borrowers, but these
initiatives are mostly directed at what has been termed the "subprime mortgage
crisis." See id. § 10.
197. See Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra note 31 (listing
authoritative entities under FCRA).
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information to CRAs, but imposes direct responsibility on
mortgage brokers to prevent fraud with multiple simultaneous
loans.' 9 Aside from more general provisions making it illegal for a
mortgage broker to commit fraud, the North Carolina legislation
requires mortgage brokers to, before closing, notify each lender of
the specifics of all other loans issued contemporaneously and
secured "by the same real property," if the broker knows of any
such loans. 199 The Act places liability on unscrupulous mortgage
brokers, which is a "critical step" in lending practices and
"[broker] compliance with fair lending laws. '' 200 If the proposed
legislation were fully complied with and full disclosure made, the
schemes in N.C. v. PeerlessReal Estate Services, Inc., Penland Real
20 1
Estate, et al. or the HELOC scheme would not be possible
because lenders would generally refuse to extend credit
subordinated to numerous other loans, at least without further
investigation.202 However, the usual case is that the unscrupulous
violator will run off with the money or spend it,20' making relief for
the borrower unrealistic. Again the legislation makes positive
steps, but fails to address and answer how this particular type of
mortgage fraud is perpetrated. 4 It may be time that the system is
changed so that it will foreclose the opportunity for this type of
fraud, not merely make it illegal in the face of an obvious and
gaping loophole.

198. See H.B. 1817, 2007-08 Sess. § 5 (N.C. 2007) (enacted as Session Law 2007352). The law amends N.C. GEN. STAT. 24-10.2 to make a mortgage broker jointly

and severally liable with the lender in brokering any violative consumer home loan.
Id.
199. Id. at sec. 7, § 53-243.10(6).
200. Ending Mortgage Abuse: SafeguardingHomebuyers: Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs - Subcomm. on Housing, Transportation,and

Community Development, 110th Cong. 9 (2007) (testimony of Michael D. Calhoun,
Center for Responsible Lending) (commenting on the lack of legislation governing
"financially motivated mortgage brokers" and "broker abuse;" also paraphrasing

from the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Ben S. Bernanke).
201. See supra Part II.C (discussing fraud schemes where perpetrators were able

to game the mortgage lending system precisely because they knew multiple loans
were being extended and the lenders did not).
202. See Carrns, supra note 1.
203. See Complaint, supra note 3,

34.

204. See generally H.B. 1817 (imposing liabilities on mortgage brokers for certain
abusive tactics, but not specifically dealing with time-gap mortgage fraud).
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Changing the System to Fix the Problem

In a mortgage industry that accounts for roughly one-fifth
of the United States' total gross domestic product,"' the
opportunity for fraud by exploiting loopholes in the FCRA
regarding timeliness of reporting mortgage lending transactions to
206
CRAs is apparent.
Fearing regulatory overreaching, the
mortgage industry is left largely unregulated because of capitalism
and free market ideals. 2°' However, Congress has been willing to
impose heavier regulation by government agencies in other areas,
based on "intelligible principles, 20 8 with the idea that the
regulation's benefits outweigh its costs and interference with the
free market.0 9
of
Prior legislation has focused on remedying the effects
•
..
210
fraud and has failed to stop fraud from the point of inception.
New amendments to the FCRA should focus on closing loopholes
that allow fraud to occur. Placing a timeliness requirement on
reporting certain extensions of credit should be considered. One
option would be to impose the requirement on all loans over a
certain amount, such as $100,000; a second option would impose
the requirement on all mortgage loans."' All creditors extending
loans, at least if that extension was based on a credit report from
the CRA, meeting the defined criteria would be required to submit
loan reports on loans committed and on loans funded by the end

205. Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 9.
206. Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra note 31.
207. See Credit Reports: Consumers' Ability to Dispute and Change Inaccurate
Information, supra note 18.
208. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001)
(holding that when Congress grants authority to agencies, it must do so with
"intelligible principles").

209. See CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 4-7 (Yale University Press 1990).
210. See supra Part III.
211. The requisite amount may be preferable as it would cut out many second
loans, which could overburden CRAs. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 18, at 42
(discussing CRAs urging of furnishers of credit information to provide more
information); See Credit Reports: Consumers' Ability to Dispute and Change
Inaccurate Information, supra note 18 (noting that all payments/accounts cannot
appear immediately due to contractually prescribed cycles, such as thirty day billing
cycles).
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of business on each Friday, or the last business day of the week. '
Implementation of this solution would have three phases.
Phase I would require affected lenders to merely report
that a loan was issued, with the specifics of the loan to come later.
Requiring such a low burden should only minimally affect both
lenders and CRAs.213 CRAs would be slightly more burdened as
mortgage loans submissions would double on affected loans, with
an initial, basic submission and then a more complete submission
later filed. By striking directly at time-gap in mortgage reporting,
fraud that takes advantage of the loophole is no longer possible
because lenders are required to have all pertinent information
immediately or almost immediately. Instead of being uncertain
whether other large loans have been issued within the last thirty to

ninety days, or even at all,2 14 evaluators of consumer credit would

have a more complete and timely report to analyze.1 5
Furthermore, if fraud is still perpetrated, the time between the
credit commitment and the discovery of the fraud would be
dramatically reduced, increasing the opportunity to apprehend the
wrongdoer, and giving victims a greater chance to remedy the
fraud.
Phase II would require affected lenders to give a full report
by the close of the business week.21 6 This phase increases the
burden on lenders, but relieves the CRAs of double submissions.
This should not be an unreasonable burden on lenders, since the
specifics of the loan are known by the closing and the technology is
available to easily transfer the information.1 7 Phase III would
212. With the creation of an inquiry tracking number, a unique number assigned
to each inquiry into consumer credit reports, submissions from furnishers of data and
Furnishers would supply this number as a key
CRAs could be streamlined.
identifying element linking the initial inquiry into a borrower's history and the final
credit decision, thereby cutting down on file fragmentation and providing for greater
efficiency. CRAs would first align the tracking number with the corresponding credit
file, and then check the file with additional identifiers (name, address, social security
number).
213. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 18, at 42 (discussing CRAs urging of
furnishers of credit information to provide more information).
214. See supra notes 18-22, 33-37 and accompanying text.
215. Id. See also Kenneth G. Gunter, Note, Computerized Credit Scoring's Effect
On the Lending Industry, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 443,444 (2000).
216. Although, if Phase I were to prove successful then the system may not need
further change.
217. MATrHEW J. LEEDS, RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE CoNTRAcrs & CLOSINGS
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require full submission to be made contemporaneously with the
loan closing.
Rapid transmission of data is technologically
feasible;218 the difficulty would come in enforcing compliance with
mandated reporting.2 However, just how much an additional preclosing step (preparing the submission) and immediate postclosing submission would cost is unknown.
In a statement made by Stuart K. Pratt, on behalf of the
Consumer Data Industry Association, he cautions that mandatory
reporting requirements would be a "regulatory overreach, sending
costs and liabilities too high . . . driving data furnishers to
220
reconsider reporting any data at all to [] members' databases.,
This would certainly be true if all data reporting were made
mandatory; but limiting mandatory data reporting to mortgage
loans or loans of a very high-value should avoid risks of
overburdening the system and driving furnishers away.
Any change to the credit reporting system needs to be
considered carefully when the voluntary reporting system is
fundamentally altered .221 Potential benefits of such an alteration of
the system, which are not present under currently proposed
legislation, include preventing mortgage fraud, increasing
accuracy, reducing fragmentation, lessening duplication, increasing
efficiency, improving accuracy in score reflections of risk, and
lessening gaming by subprime lenders. 22 ' These benefits need to be
weighed against the potential adverse consequences, including:
expense, efficiency concerns, backlash and outcry from furnishers,
accuracy, feasibility, and potential effects harming competition and
shopping loans.

486 (Practicing Law Institute 2004).
218. Credit Report Accuracy, supra note 16, at 298. Inquiries into credit reports
already appear immediately. See, An Overview of Consumer Data and Credit
Reporting, supra note 50. As high as ninety percent of all data received by CRAs is
submitted electronically. See Credit Reports: Consumers' Ability to Dispute and
Change InaccurateInformation, supra note 18.
219. See id. It is beyond the scope of this Note whether implementation should be
mandated by a federal amendment to FCRA or through self-regulation by CRAs.
220. Credit Reports: Consumers' Ability to Dispute and Change Inaccurate
Information,supra note 18.
221. CreditReport Accuracy, supra note 16, at 322.
222. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION

Current legislation and industry standards leave a loophole
for fraud. The FCRA, as amended by FACTA, imposes upon
lenders and other furnishers of credit information the requirement
23
that they may not knowingly submit false information to CRAs.
Left with no affirmative duty to report, and with no timeliness
requirement, the mortgage lending and credit reporting industries
have failed to adequately regulate and prevent fraud. A time-gap
of between thirty and ninety days exposes unknowing lenders and
the public to a fog where perpetrators of fraud prey. In one of the
most recent fraud schemes, Penland Real Estate, fraud
perpetrators swindled Americans nationwide and their banks out
of over $100 million.224 Legislation must step up to the task of
closing the time-gap, where con artists can conduct multiple,
contemporaneous loan transactions and spend other people's
money before being caught.
Proposed and recent legislation is beginning to attack the
edges of the time-gap. North Carolina has recently enacted
legislation that explicitly imposes a duty on all real mortgage
brokers to inform each lenders of the specifics of all other loans
issued contemporaneously and secured by the same property. 5
Other federally proposed legislation, the STOP FRAUD Act,
would allocate $80 million to fraud prevention and set up a
nationwide fraud trend database.22 Furthermore, each law would
explicitly make time-gap fraud illegal. 7 However, no new or
proposed legislation fixes the system.
New legislation should not take a stab at mortgage fraud
with only remedial propositions, but should strike at the heart of a
system that allows for it to be easily perpetrated. The burdens and
costs of mortgage fraud are incalculable. No dollar figure can
measure the costs of a family who loses everything to fraud, and
the benefits should outweigh burdens placed on mortgage lenders

223. FCRA, 15 U.S.C.A. §1681 (West 2000 & F. Supp. 2007).
224. Complaint, supra note 3.

225. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
227. See supra Part IV.A-B.
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and CRAs to report immediately. If committed loans appear on
borrower's credit reports simultaneous with their closing, no timegap exists which fraud perpetrators can exploit. New legislation
must change the credit reporting system to protect banks and the
public, and stop time-gap fraud.
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